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The Plausibility of Creationism: A Sociological Comment 
 
Mathew Guest 
 
Introduction 
 
“If the system of flood geology can be established on a sound scientific basis, 
and be effectively promoted and publicized, then the entire evolutionary 
cosmology, at least in its present neo-Darwinian form, will collapse. This, in 
turn, would mean that every anti-Christian system and movement 
(communism, racism, humanism, libertinism, behaviorism, and all the rest) 
would be deprived of their pseudo-intellectual foundation.”  (Henry M. 
Morris, Scientific Creationism)1 
 
By the mid 1970s, the ‘scientific creationism’ popularised by figures like Henry 
Morris was well established in the United States. The conviction behind vitriolic 
statements like the one cited above, that the truth of the Genesis flood account could 
be proven using the conventional methods of the natural sciences, was no longer 
merely the stuff of fundamentalist apologetic, but was part of an applied and well 
resourced scientific agenda. Morris was a trained civil engineer, known during his 
student days as a gifted mathematician as well as a zealous evangelical who later 
gained a PhD in hydraulics and geology. He used his scientific knowledge to support 
his ‘young earth’ creationist beliefs, defending the need for Bible-believing Christians 
to address the false claims of evolution on scientific grounds. Thus while his famous 
volume The Genesis Flood (co-written by John Whitcomb and published in 1961) was 
premised on the inerrancy and infallibility of the scriptures, the claims found within 
Genesis were supported and elaborated using established scientific laws and 
geological evidence. In this way, the work of Whitcomb and Morris represented an 
extension of a trend among the pioneers of fundamentalist Christianity who were 
writing around the turn of the twentieth century. Their reactionary interpretations of 
Genesis were not pre-modern as such, but reflected the modernist assumptions of the 
age, so that theological refutations of evolution presented the Genesis account as a 
series of factual, propositional statements, issuing straightforward and unmediated 
truth, available for all to see. Later, apologists for the creationist perspective would 
attempt to treat Genesis as a scientific document, extending its factual status into 
applications in geology, palaeontology, archaeology and the biological sciences. As a 
reliable guide to life and its origins, Genesis acquired the additional status of 
textbook, research guide and historical record. In this sense, the so called 
fundamentalist resurgence did not represent a yearning for pre-modern Christendom, 
but a thoroughly modern attempt to defend the integrity of the boundaries of Biblical 
Christianity. Creationism emerged as a major dimension to this ongoing manoeuvre 
among the champions of conservative Christianity.  
 
But what was at stake in the efforts of figures like Henry Morris was not just the 
reliability or otherwise of Darwinian evolution as a means of explaining the origins of 
life. As the citation above vividly demonstrates, evolution had become associated 
with all that was wrong with western modernity: materialism, the debasement of 
humankind, selfishness and ruthless rivalry, the devaluation of life as a gift from God, 
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and a rejection of the absolute authority of scripture in all things, not to mention the 
usual bêtes noires of the American right such as liberalism and communism. The 
creationist cause had acquired a strong cultural significance in seeking to defend not 
just biblical authority, but a way of life, a social order, and a complex set of 
ideological interests. In this respect, the modern appropriation of Genesis has become 
a matter not just of biblical hermeneutics, but of cultural identity.     
 
Much of the existing scholarship on the evolution-creationism conflict has been 
historical and theological, charting the contours of the developing debate or 
commenting on the merits of emerging perspectives. What follows is a sociological 
discussion; my concern is not with the validity of creationism, but with how 
creationist ideas function within the social contexts in which they are affirmed, 
debated and challenged. Axiomatic to a sociological approach is the assumption that 
changes in belief may be explained with reference to changes in the social structures 
of society, and not simply with reference to the ideas and behaviour of individuals. 
Hence Peter Berger’s claim that the religious crises of modernity are not due to “any 
mysterious metamorphoses of consciousness” but can “be explained in terms of 
empirically available developments in the social structures and the social psychology 
of modern societies.”2 My concern in this chapter is to explore how the popularity of 
creationist ideas within contemporary western cultures may be explained in a similar 
way. A more specific focus, to use sociological language, is the apparent plausibility 
of creationism, i.e. how and why the claims associated with creationism are viewed as 
plausible by those who affirm them.   
 
 
The Genesis of Creationism 
 
The history of Christian fundamentalism has been characterised by several dramatic 
controversies which are often said to have played a greater part in shaping the course 
of this movement than more steady flows of cultural and religious change. In so far as 
fundamentalism is an essentially reactionary movement, perhaps this is a fair 
assessment. These controversies certainly continue to influence the contours of 
fundamentalist identity in that particular issues remain bones of contention and foci 
for a perennial conflict with modern culture. The evolution-creationism debate is a 
prime – perhaps the prime – case in point. It represents one of the most enduring 
points of difference between conservative Christianity and western society, and hence 
generates potent identity markers. This is especially the case in the contemporary 
USA, in which debates over the respective legitimacy of evolution and creationism 
continue to inflame the ‘culture wars’ that divide conservatives from liberals, more so, 
claims evangelical historian Mark Noll, than any other issue since 1960, except 
abortion.3  
  
Noll is one of the many contemporary evangelical thinkers who lament the fact that 
the creationism issue has maintained a position of such importance throughout the 
twentieth century, chiefly because it has contributed to the disengagement of 
evangelicals from mainstream scholarship to the detriment of its theology. Noll points 
out that the young earth creationism that has become so popular during the last four 
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 Mark A. Noll, The Scandal of the Evangelical Mind (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 1994), p.  192. 
decades was not characteristic of conservative Protestant thought at the end of the 
nineteenth or the beginning of the twentieth centuries. Key conservative figures like 
James Orr and B.B. Warfield - both of whom wrote for the famous pamphlets 
published as The Fundamentals (1910-1915) and hence were influential within the 
emerging fundamentalist movement - accepted evolution as a means by which God 
created the earth. Historian of creationism Ronald Numbers argues that early 
fundamentalism in the USA viewed higher criticism - which treated scripture as a set 
of historical documents rather than as the inspired Word of God - as a greater threat to 
Christianity than evolution. The volumes of The Fundamentals, while repeatedly 
touching on the subject of evolution, offered a variety of perspectives on it. As 
Numbers comments, “Fundamentalists may not have liked evolution, but at this time 
few, if any, saw the necessity or desirability of launching a crusade to eradicate it 
from the schools and churches of America.”4  
 
To be sure, the roots of creationism lie in nineteenth century millenarianism, 
especially as maintained by the Plymouth Brethren, who discerned an entire 
chronology of salvation history in the Biblical texts, from terrestrial origins in 
Genesis, to predictions of the end times in the Book of Revelation. Such ideas filtered 
into broader debates about the nature of Biblical truth, and Biblical literalism 
gradually gained popularity in large part because of its support among scholars at 
Princeton Theological Seminary. However, Darwinian evolutionary theory did not 
become a major target of fundamentalist hostility until the 1920s. It is here that 
controversy and social drama appears to overtake steady processes of change, and the 
so-called Scopes Monkey Trial is frequently cited as the public spectacle that did 
most to crystallise the fundamentalist cause. The event took place in Dayton, 
Tennessee in 1925, when local school teacher John Scopes was tried for teaching 
biology using a text book – George William Hunter’s A Civic Biology - that included 
a positive account of evolutionary theory. The case has become infamous, 
symbolising a deeper conflict between academia and popular wisdom, between 
freedom of enquiry and the Bible, and marking out battle lines that remain visible in 
US public debate almost a century later. What is often overlooked in popular and 
scholarly accounts is that the Scopes Trial was not a spontaneous expression of 
insidious cultural tensions, but was a stage-managed public event, orchestrated by 
advocates of the two opposing sides. Recently passed state law had banned the 
teaching of evolution in Tennessee schools. The American Civil Liberties Union set 
up the Dayton trial as a ‘test case’ aimed at challenging this law as unconstitutional, 
and advertised for volunteer teachers to stand in the dock (assuring them they would 
not lose their jobs). The ACLU cause focused on freedom of speech and academic 
freedom, which they claimed were threatened by the new legislation. Meanwhile, the 
World’s Christian Fundamentals Association were in nearby Memphis, debating why 
Tennessee taxpayers should permit evolution and modernism to be freely taught at 
schools when the church-state separation outlawed the reading of the scriptures in the 
classroom. Hence the pro-Bible faction set themselves up against John Scopes, the 
willing volunteer teacher, whose case was put by Clarence Darrow, the chief attorney 
for the defence whose own inclination was to reject Christianity while affirming 
materialistic evolution.      
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The Scopes spectacle and the ripples it caused across the US has been expertly 
charted in Edward J. Larson’s book Trial and Error, which corrects popular wisdom 
in recounting the history of the evolution-creationism debate as complex and multi-
faceted, driven by multiple agendas and convoluted interests (for example, the trial 
coincided with efforts by local leaders who were keen to put Dayton on the map, 
hence the momentum behind the publicity).5 The outcome of the trial is well known: 
Scopes was convicted, but the decision was soon overturned on a technicality. The 
defence cried fowl play, as without a conviction, they could not appeal and hence 
continue in their very public attempt to prove the law was unconstitutional (thus 
leaving an open door for other states to pass similar anti-evolution measures). 
However, the most significant result was the effective discrediting of the anti-
evolution movement, ridiculed as backward, ignorant and uneducated by the media, 
an image made popular in the fictionalised dramatisation of the trial, Inherit the Wind, 
produced in theatres from 1955 and released as a Hollywood movie starring Spencer 
Tracy in 1960.    
 
What followed was, according to historian George Marsden, a “dark age” for 
conservative evangelical scholarship as fundamentalists withdrew from public life 
and, seeking to protect their members from the influence of evolutionary ideas, 
established organisations over which they could exert strict control. New 
denominations, church fellowships and Bible institutes emerged as separatism became 
the fundamentalist norm. This coincided with what has come to be known as the 
‘Great Reversal’. Newly pessimistic about the human condition following the horrors 
of the First World War, and highly sceptical of theology tinged with leftist principles 
following the Russian Revolution of 1917, evangelicals turned away from social 
reform and instead focused on personal piety and evangelism, portraying the wider 
culture in increasingly negative terms. Modern science was taken to be representative 
of this culture, and Marsden associates this period with the genuine polarisation of 
pro-science and pro-Bible camps.6 Whereas conservative Protestants had previously 
allowed some room for argument about the precise status of evolution, the events 
surrounding the Scopes trial had forced a turn inward, introducing a period of 
fundamentalist separatism.  
 
A newfound public confidence emerged several decades later, with figures like Ellen 
G. White and George McCready Price, both Seventh Day Adventists who advanced 
creation accounts with the deluge centre stage, and later, Whitcomb and Morris’s The 
Genesis Flood, which put Price’s points more persuasively, not least on account of 
Morris’s scientific expertise. The subsequent popularity of creationism is partly, so 
Mark Noll argues, down to the massive investment in scientific education by the US 
government in the wake of the USSR’s launch of space shuttle Sputnik in 1957, 
which generated the production and dissemination of biology textbooks that described 
the cosmos in evolutionary terms. This was perceived locally as federal interference 
and the rise of creationist sentiments was one expression of popular protest.7 
Following the consequent textbook controversies of the 1960s and 70s, creationism 
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began to be taken seriously by the wider public, including scientists and educators.8 
Some of these professionals attempted to reconceive creationism on scientific, rather 
than theological grounds, in order to lend it more credibility among the wider 
population and as a potential means of getting creationist ideas taught in public 
schools.9 This trend has come to be known under the umbrella term of Creation 
Science, with various efforts to challenge evolution on scientific grounds supported 
by organisations like the Creation Research Society (est. 1963) and the Institute for 
Creation Research (est. 1970). Later, Intelligent Design would emerge as a new set of 
arguments but with the same aim of discrediting evolution as an unreliable or at least 
insufficient explanation of the origins of life.10    
 
Ronald Numbers has pointed out that creationism - rather than persist as a fixed set of 
ideas - has actually evolved throughout the 20th century, taking on different emphases 
in response to changing cultural challenges and developments among its advocates 
within conservative Christianity. An early openness and breadth of perspectives gave 
way to a polarisation of positions after the 1920s, with a fresh engagement with 
science emerging in the 1960s. However, this engagement has not engendered a 
straightforward accommodation of creationist arguments to the norms of secular 
modernity. If anything, in the latter decades of the twentieth century, creationists have 
become more radical in setting up clear boundaries between the Christian worldview 
they represent and that represented by ‘the world’ as they see it.11  
 
This trend is reflected in the available survey data. In 1991, a Gallup Poll revealed 
that 47% of US citizens, including 25% of college graduates, believed that “God 
created man pretty much in his present form at one time within the last 10,000 years.” 
In 2005, the same organisation, this time using a slightly different wording, found that 
53% of Americans agreed with the statement “God created human beings in their 
present form exactly the way the Bible describes it.” The 6 percentage point increase 
is more striking because the revised wording arguably suggests a more 
uncompromising, dogmatically Biblical position than the original, which at least 
allows for some margin of error.12 While the evidence is not conclusive, what 
evidence there is suggests that creationist beliefs have demanded a steadily increasing 
level of assent within the USA over the past 40 years.13 
 
A similar pattern is exposed by an examination of levels of scepticism about 
evolution. In an international survey of over 30 European countries, plus the USA and 
Japan, Miller, Scott and Okamoto asked a sample of adults whether they believed in 
the statement that “Human beings, as we know them, developed from earlier species 
of animals”. They found that, in 2005, US adults were less likely to accept the concept 
of evolution than adults in all but one of the nations surveyed. Moreover, drawing 
from longitudinal data, they found that, over the previous 20 years, the percentage of 
US adults accepting the idea of evolution had dropped from 45 to 40%, with those 
unsure about evolution increasing from 7% in 1985 to 21% in 2005. Levels of 
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acceptance of evolution in France, Iceland, Sweden and Denmark were 80% plus, 
with 78% for Japan and a figure in the mid 70s for the United Kingdom.14  
  
The uptake of creationist ideas in the UK has always been more muted, in part 
because the fundamentalist controversies were resolved earlier, were less public and 
less intense, and the very different educational and political institutions of Britain tend 
to foment popular protest to a lesser degree than their US equivalents. Evidence for its 
limited appeal can be found in available survey data. By way of illustration, in a 
survey, published in 2005, of over 7,000 Church of England clergy and laity, Francis 
et al asked questions about belief in evolution and six-day creation, working with the 
two statements “God made the world in six days and rested on the seventh” and “I 
believe that all living things evolved”. The survey revealed that 17% of the laity and 
10% of clergy agreed with the first, creationist-style statement, while 67% of the laity 
and 74% of clergy believed in evolution.15 Hence, creationism remains the preference 
of only a small minority, and church leaders actually appear less dogmatic than their 
congregations on this issue. And yet in recent years, creationism has emerged within 
public controversies in the British context, as sympathetic agencies have sought to re-
introduce ideas of creationism or intelligent design into the school classroom. Most 
concern has been expressed with respect to newly established City Academies, 
secondary schools partly funded by private sector benefactors, who thereby achieve 
some control over the content of the taught curriculum, pupil recruitment and 
staffing.16 While this has led to some public outcry, the notion that creationism has 
achieved significant momentum as an alternative explanatory schema among school 
children and churchgoers commands only limited evidential backing.  
 
 
Plausibility Structures and Cognitive Bargaining 
 
One of the dominant strands within the contemporary sociology of religion is the ‘god 
of the gaps’ hypothesis: within modernity, religion acquires a social function only in 
so far as this function is not otherwise fulfilled by non-religious agencies. It is pushed 
to the margins, concerned mainly with personal, emotional or private concerns, or else 
caters to existential needs precipitated by cultural crises, which are therefore atypical 
or pathological, and emerging religious movements rarely directly challenge dominant 
cultural norms and values.17 Such is the nature of secularization in the West, as we 
witness religious movements bending to fit the increasingly diminishing spaces that 
society allows it to occupy.18   
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The rise of creationism represents a rather different phenomenon, one that does not so 
easily fit into this pattern. In many forms, it directly undermines mainstream science, 
challenging the notion that religious groups have conceded the job of explaining the 
natural world to the secular sciences. In doing this, creationist sympathisers occupy 
new social space in which their evangelical Christianity may extend its cultural 
influence, thus working against the structural differentiation that many sociologists 
have argued is quintessential to the modern condition.19 Religion is not bound within 
shrinking pockets of significance, but is breaking out of them. Most strikingly, 
perhaps, creationism and its associated belief claims appear to be radically 
incongruent with the modernized consciousness many have argued is dominant within 
western cultures, and yet is growing in popularity, especially in the USA. In other 
words, one has to account sociologically for the means whereby creationism is 
maintained as a plausible set of belief claims within a social context largely hostile to 
such claims.  
 
In reflecting on this question, it is instructive to turn to the classic work of Peter 
Berger, who originally coined the term ‘plausibility structures’ within his work in the 
sociology of religion during the 1960s. While the assumptions behind his arguments 
are complex, his central claim can be formulated with relative simplicity, and may be 
summarised here in a quotation from his seminal work, The Sacred Canopy, published 
in Britain as The Social Reality of Religion: “Any particular religious world will 
present itself to consciousness as reality only to the extent that its appropriate 
plausibility structure is kept in existence.”20 For Berger, a plausibility structure may 
take a variety of potential forms, whether a relatively durable institution or a more 
loosely organised network of discursive exchange. He is not arguing that social 
structural phenomena have causal priority over ideas, nor vice versa. Rather, his claim 
is simply that there needs to be some kind of affinity between the two for a body of 
beliefs and values to remain plausible.21 Hence Berger’s secularization argument, that 
religion has declined in social significance because the plausibility structures that 
once supported it have become fragmented or weakened.  
 
Berger’s later work on religion is concerned with the options available to religious 
groups which face the secularizing influence of the modern world. How might they 
preserve their belief systems once they have become a ‘cognitive minority’? One 
option, so Berger argues, is cognitive retrenchment, i.e. a denial of the validity of the 
values of secular modernity and a re-affirmation of the whole of a traditional belief 
system as it stands.22 In a defensive form, it requires a withdrawal from society, and 
the creation and maintenance of a closed religious subculture, preserved from the 
wider society by separation. This is the option most readily cited by Berger, who 
speaks of the task of maintaining “cognitive deviance” in terms of the construction of 
“firm plausibility structures.23 In A Rumour of Angels, Berger is more specific still, 
arguing that conservative religious groups are best equipped to resist the deleterious 
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influences of modern culture by existing as counter-communities, fostering 
homogeneity, solidarity among members and a clearly defined set of boundaries that 
set them apart from the outside world.24 Historically, this strategy has been relatively 
popular among Christian fundamentalists, who have often sought refuge from the 
modern world by withdrawing into separatist or sectarian communities, either through 
radical separation from society – as with the Exclusive Brethren – or by selectively 
controlling the extent to which their members are exposed to external influences, as 
occurred during the ‘Great Reversal’ when fundamentalists in the USA withdrew into 
their own institutions. A striking example of this trend may be found in the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, who, out of fear of evolution and other ‘heresies’, have discouraged their 
children from attending school beyond that required by law, quite aside from 
requesting their absence from Religious Education and collective acts of worship. 
While this might be judged an effective means of sustaining deviant ideas like those 
associated with creationism, this strategy has arguably been disabling to the 
creationist cause. As Ronald Numbers notes, in the US context, educational 
separatism has meant that the Witnesses produced few scientists or educated 
individuals capable of engaging with the technical aspects of the creationism debate in 
a sophisticated manner.25 Withdrawal denies the group the cultural capital with which 
they may defend and advance their cause in the wider arena, an endeavour that has 
preoccupied, and arguably vitalised, creationist sympathisers at least since the 
passionate debates in the southern US states during the early decades of the twentieth 
century.   
 
There is also cause to question whether, in the contemporary context, the sectarian 
form of religion described by Berger is sustainable at all. Given the cultural 
conditions of late modernity - mass communication and the internet, increased global 
travel and the ubiquity of the televisual media, not to mention increased geographical 
and social mobility within and between western nations - social isolationism appears 
more and more an unachievable aspiration. Even if achieved, it is difficult to imagine 
how it could be sustained over generations. Support for this view is found in Nancy 
Ammerman’s ethnographic study of fundamentalist Christians within the Southern 
Baptist Convention during the 1980s. Ammerman finds that creationism is a 
particularly difficult aspect of the fundamentalist worldview to sustain and for new or 
young believers to fully accept, given the prominence of evolutionary ideas in the 
wider world and within school curricula. She suggests that full acceptance may 
depend on a strong commitment to the other aspects of the fundamentalist worldview.  
 
“To accept on faith that all the scientific evidence is erroneous requires a 
strong commitment to the other ideas of Fundamentalism. If the issue of 
evolution arises too early in the process of integration into the fellowship, it 
can destroy the plausibility of the rest of the world view. In the outside world, 
discarding evolution is seen as ridiculous. Only when a convert is firmly on 
the inside do the arguments against evolution make sense. In the early weeks 
and months, new members may have to put that issue aside, concentrating 
instead on the ideas and life changes they find acceptable…As converts devote 
more and more time and energy to religious activities and adopt 
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Fundamentalists as their primary reference group, even ideas that are difficult 
to apprehend become plausible.”26  
 
The sociological concept of defensive cognitive retrenchment has only limited value 
in accounting for how the plausibility of creationist ideas has been sustained during 
the modern period. Ammerman’s study, among others, suggests that creationist ideas 
have been taken on gradually, and have not been impervious to change and 
development at the popular, as well as intellectual, level. The relationship of 
creationism to the cultural context in which it is expressed and affirmed is not rigid 
and uncompromising, in spite of the rhetorical claims of its advocates and detractors, 
but has been complex and subtle, one of cognitive bargaining, rather than cognitive 
retrenchment.  
 
If the development of creationism reflects a process of ‘cognitive bargaining’, then it 
is not a process that is unprecedented. Berger himself cites the example of liberal 
Protestantism during the nineteenth century, which engaged in a “bargaining process 
with secular thought” after secular intellectuals, rather than other theologians, had 
become the “arbiters of cognitive acceptability.”27 The development of creationist 
thought represents merely another strand in Protestant Christianity’s struggle with the 
modern age, although here, what is up for negotiation is not the virgin birth or Jesus’ 
miracles, but the validity of the Genesis account of the origin of the world. This 
historical comparison must also be qualified in so far as the liberal Protestants were 
engaging with a culture they felt embodied values worthy of praise – not least 
Enlightenment rationality and human progress – whereas modern-day creationists 
have consistently viewed western culture in thoroughly negative terms. Both cases do 
reflect, however, some accommodation to the cognitive norms of secular modernity. 
The emergence of Creation Science and of Intelligent Design are prime examples of 
how the norms and language of mainstream scientific endeavour have been adopted – 
or at least ostensibly imitated – as a means of garnering credibility for otherwise 
rather maverick theories. Whether these examples represent a genuine 
accommodation of the creationist camp to the culture it purportedly opposes, or are 
better interpreted as a creative negotiation of public discourse which leaves the 
underlying convictions relatively intact, is a moot point.  
 
 
Order and Meaning 
 
One aspect of the popular affirmation of creationism for which there is significant 
evidence relates to the need for a sense of cosmic order congruent with a 
fundamentalist perspective on truth. This lies at the heart of Nancy Ammerman’s 
empirical study of fundamentalist beliefs, which concerns itself with how 
fundamentalist Christians preserve a clear framework for dealing with the world and 
one’s place in it and that renders clear one’s religious obligations. Because 
creationism instils a greater sense of orderliness (in contrast with evolutionary theory, 
which is associated with random chance) and because it is viewed as biblical, it is 
well suited for this purpose. Ammerman makes this point in her discussion of how 
southern Baptists interpret Romans 8:28: “And we know that in all things God works 
                                                 
26
 Nancy T. Ammerman, Bible Believers. Fundamentalists in the Modern World (New Brunswick, NJ and 
London: Rutgers University Press, 1987), p.  165. 
27
 Berger, Social Reality of Religion, pp. 159; 158. 
for the good of those who love him, and who have been called according to his 
purpose.”  
 
“The members of Southside take that verse to mean that God has a purpose for 
everything and that because they are Christians they will be able to discover 
and live by God’s orderly plan. Just as they are sure that the universe did not 
originate by chance evolution, so they are also sure that nothing in today’s 
world happens by chance either. Believers can know that God causes 
everything as surely as they know that day follows night and that for 
everything there is a season.”28  
 
Hence creationism embodies the popular Christian affirmation that there is an order 
and purpose to the world and to human existence, and that this order is ordained by 
God and revealed in the scriptures. Creationism also functions as an effective 
fundamentalist identity marker precisely because it is understood over and against 
evolution, which carries connotations of chance, disorder, and a faith in science – the 
world – over the Bible.29 The fact that this quest for order and certainty in an 
otherwise uncertain world has arguably gained momentum in recent decades evokes 
descriptions of the postmodern character of contemporary western culture.30 The 
projection of a Bible-based chronology onto human history may then be interpreted 
sociologically as a response to cultural instability, providing a framework of meaning 
that has clear temporal, as well as theological, boundaries. Perhaps it is unsurprising, 
therefore, that creationism can often be found alongside apocalyptic as an ideological 
priority among world-renouncing elements of the Christian community.   
 
In another of the few detailed studies of creationist belief, this time set within the UK 
context, the role of creationism in instilling a sense of ontological order is illuminated 
further. Leslie Francis attempted to explore how creationist ideas are viewed by 
young people. In his survey of 34,000 13-15 year olds in England and Wales, he 
found that 20% agreed or strongly agreed with the creationist belief that “God made 
the world in six days and rested on the seventh”.31 Cross-tabulation with responses to 
other questions revealed some interesting patterns, including a positive correlation 
between belief in creationism and belief in a series of other, rather unconventional 
ideas, including horoscopes, the devil, contacting spirits of the dead and ghosts. Jeff 
Astley addresses these patterns in the data and argues for associating these beliefs 
with credulity, i.e. those who believe in creationism are also ready to believe in a wide 
range of unconventional ideas.32 Perhaps underlying this is a propensity among some 
to find plausibility in things counter-cultural, or at least counter to a model of culture 
they have learnt is to be opposed. The world-denying logic of conservative forms of 
evangelicalism - often structured around strict dichotomies - lends credence to this 
underlying pattern, although we might be surprised to find belief in horoscopes and 
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ghosts openly endorsed within their churches. An alternative explanation might be 
that those willing to profess belief in creationism are sceptical of the rational scientific 
worldview and their commitment to things like horoscopes and black magic reflects 
this scepticism and a concomitant belief in things preternatural. Here, creationism 
belongs to the same family of beliefs as horoscopes because it expresses a scepticism 
towards the view that life can satisfactorily be dealt with by reference to purely 
rational or scientific arguments. According to this argument, creationism might be 
adopted as part of a complex wider constellation of convictions and interests which 
represents an alternative worldview (or set of worldviews) from that associated with 
hard, traditional science, which is sometimes viewed as a threat to religion, and even, 
among some, as undermining a holistic understanding of selfhood. Eileen Barker 
advances a similar argument, suggesting that a cultural climate receptive to creationist 
claims was fostered during the 1960s following a sense of disillusionment with 
mainstream science. Viewed as cold, overly rational and mechanistic, science failed to 
resonate with newfound cultural values like spontaneity, humanitarianism and a sense 
of higher truth beyond the material.33 In this sense, creationism may have gained 
credence on the basis of the same set of cultural values as some practices associated 
with the ‘New Age’ movement, even though their usual contexts of expression are 
likely to emphasize their differences.  
 
The above argument rests on a set of assumptions about the grounds of plausibility 
that break somewhat with Berger’s work, or at least interpret his arguments more 
broadly than is usual. Here, plausibility structures may not necessarily inhere in 
identifiable social frameworks – for example schools, churches, or relatively coherent 
patterns of shared discourse among like-minded peers – but may emerge more 
disparately, from more deeply embedded cultural norms that may exist on a sub-
conscious or pre-reflexive level. These structures may become manifest in 
institutional forms, but they need not entirely depend upon them and, because of their 
deep embeddedness, are difficult to challenge effectively. Such an understanding of 
plausibility structures underpins historian George Marsden’s astute comments on the 
development of Christian fundamentalism on either side of the Atlantic. Marsden 
charts how the revivalist and millenarian traditions of the early nineteenth century 
were highly influential among evangelicals in the USA and in England, and yet gave 
way to very different patterns of development in subsequent decades. Most strikingly, 
the vitriolic and public attacks on evolution which characterised the US movement 
from the 1920s onwards sustained only very limited sympathy among conservative 
Christians in the UK. Marsden appeals to a variety of factors in attempting to explain 
the transatlantic difference, including the geographical peculiarities that render 
regional cross-fertilization of ideas far slower in the US context, although he has to 
qualify his argument on account of the fact that the principal centres of the 
fundamentalist movement were initially urban and northern – not least Princeton 
Seminary – rather than rural and relatively isolated.34 Much more persuasive is 
Marsden’s invocation of culturally established traditions of meaning and legitimacy, 
often rooted in complex expressions of political and religious thought which have 
subsequently been subsumed into the governing norms of social life. For example, he 
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cites a predisposition among the nineteenth century English for gradualist ideas, ideas 
which had shaped the intellectual climate for some time, and which meant the English 
were more naturally receptive to Darwin’s theories (and to higher criticism of 
scripture, which also rested on an assumption of historical contingency) than the 
North Americans. By contrast, the newness of the USA demanded a written and 
rationally defined constitution, which became enshrined in the nation’s self-
understanding. US revivalism was heavily shaped by the Calvinist tradition, with its 
predilection for “formulated statements of religious truth”, which were invoked as a 
yardstick of Christian legitimacy, with little or no room for error or ambiguity.35 The 
dominant philosophical framework underpinning theological debate and educational 
process remained the ‘common sense realism’ of the Scottish Enlightenment, which 
was based on the assumption that knowledge may be acquired by the individual 
through direct, unmediated observation of the world. Filtered into popular theological 
understandings of human experience and the divine therein, this left little room for 
interpretation or development; as knowledge was plain and evident, so too was the 
truth of the Bible, unchangeable and timeless in the form it is received. This complex 
of factors fostered a culture of understanding based around clearly formulated, 
unchanging truths. Within this context, the gradualist, developmental emphases of 
Darwinism were not only theologically offensive; they were intellectually and 
culturally incongruent. 
       
 
Creationism as Engaged Orthodoxy 
 
An alternative way of viewing creationism is through the notion of ‘engaged 
orthodoxy’, formulated by sociologist Christian Smith in his research into 
contemporary evangelicalism. On the basis of his extensive empirical studies of 
evangelical Christianity across the USA, Smith has argued for a positive correlation 
between evangelical vitality and cultural engagement. This orientation he refers to as 
‘engaged orthodoxy’, drawing illustration from the so-called ‘new evangelicals’ of the 
1940s, like Carl F. H. Henry, Charles Fuller and Billy Graham. These influential 
figures remained “…fully committed to maintaining and promoting confidently 
traditional, orthodox Protestant theology and belief, while at the same time becoming 
confidently and proactively engaged in the intellectual, cultural, social, and political 
life of the nation.”36  
 
For Smith, key to the evangelical response to modernity is the impulse to draw clear 
symbolic boundaries, thus distinguishing believers from relevant ‘outgroups’, 
including secular culture and other religious traditions. However, this does not lead in 
the direction of sectarianism. While Berger, and James Davison Hunter in his work,37 
tends to paint religion as a relatively passive force, fending off the forces of 
modernity from a defensive position, Smith highlights the drives internal to 
evangelicalism which foster an orientation characterized by active engagement with 
the world. Moreover, this active engagement appears to include a capacity for a 
strategic re-negotiation of collective identity, in light of the changing socio-cultural 
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environments that evangelicals confront. In other words, evangelicals do 
accommodate their position in response to cultural change, but part of this process of 
accommodation involves a revitalization of evangelical identity, not least by focusing 
on new sources of opposition. Smith contrasts the anti-communism and anti-
Catholicism of previous generations with the opposition to moral relativism and 
homosexual rights in more recent decades. An adjustment is evident, but a strong 
sense of evangelical identity boundaries remains firmly intact. Moreover, the 
pluralism characteristic of late modern culture offers evangelicals a favourable 
environment in which to thrive because it “creates a situation in which evangelicals 
can perpetually maintain but can never resolve their struggle with the non-evangelical 
world”.38 It is this struggle, which previous commentators have often interpreted as an 
index of weakness, that Smith argues actually generates vitality, reinforcing 
evangelicalism’s boundaries while at the same time creating opportunities for 
engagement with a wider culture in need of redemption.39                    
 
Smith’s analysis is focused explicitly on evangelical Christianity, his arguments only 
applying to fundamentalism to a limited degree, in part because of a tendency among 
fundamentalists to withdraw from, rather than engage, with the wider cultural context. 
Given the association of creationist belief with fundamentalist Christianity, rather 
than with evangelicalism as such, we might legitimately ask whether Smith’s 
arguments really apply in this case. Indeed, according to recent studies, creationism 
commands only limited assent among self-described evangelicals, even in the USA.40 
And yet creationism as we have presented it above is not bound by any particular 
Christian group, nor is it inextricably entwined within a coherent worldview. Its 
history suggests a tendency towards dynamic redeployment among resourceful 
Christians whose cause has been enlivened through their energetic attempts to 
campaign for a greater public status of creationism in political, educational and civic 
contexts. It has momentum within the context of power struggles which have a far 
wider reference than Christian belief, and as such circulates as religious and cultural 
capital beyond the immediate scope of individual or corporate advocacy. 
Consequently, I would argue that we stand to learn more about the social significance 
of creationism by studying its deployment as a means of cultural engagement, rather 
than as a propositional tenet to which individuals may or may not subscribe.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In order to illustrate the positive potential of an analysis of creationism from this 
perspective, I would like to offer three points by way of conclusion, all of which look 
back to what we know about this phenomenon, while pointing forward to likely future 
trajectories. First, the cultural engagement embodied within Smith’s model 
emphasizes the combative character of evangelicalism, the sense of struggle with the 
world. This is in perfect congruence with the history of creationism, which has been a 
channel for the affirmation of a strict truth-world dichotomy - undeniably essential to 
the plausibility of the conservative Protestant perspective - while not, for the most 
part, withdrawing into strict sectarianism. This is in part due to the fact that, from the 
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very beginnings of fundamentalist controversy, creationism was a matter of public 
education and hence drew in the interests of entire communities. It is not incidental 
that the issue has arisen in the presumably post-Christian UK within educational 
debates about proper approaches to biology. Indeed, the recent prominence of 
passionate atheists within the public arena like Richard Dawkins, Polly Toynbee and 
Christopher Hitchens will probably ensure that such matters are, for the time being, 
kept on the national agenda.41 It is conflict and disagreement, rather than consensus, 
that feeds the creationist controversy.  
 
Second, the logic of cultural engagement requires a certain lack of resolution, a sense 
that discussion is in progress, that debate is ongoing. Again, this has characterized the 
development of creationism in so far as it has remained a highly contentious issue, 
perhaps inevitably within a modern context. But this tension is also sustained by an 
epistemological trend at the heart of contemporary conservative Protestantism: that 
truth is both plain and encoded. The Plain Truth is the title of a well known magazine 
that advocates creationist ideas, and the notion conveyed in its title echoes the 
common sense realism that so radically shaped the US evangelical tradition. The truth 
is there for all who will see. In so far as this is the case, the mediatory functions of 
church, leaders and tradition are bypassed, and this voluntarist tradition is now well 
established across the western evangelical movement. However, the conditions of late 
modernity have radicalized it, as the forces of globalization and the mass media have 
empowered individuals to seek out truth through consumer products they purchase 
and appropriate according to their own tastes. The interactive possibilities of the 
internet offer individuals the opportunity to also be the producers of this culture, and 
the web is now awash with home pages promoting new conspiracy theories, hidden 
messages in ancient texts, and insidious connections between unsavory power 
brokers. The popularity of Dan Brown’s The Da Vinci Code as well as the Left Behind 
series have heightened this sense that ‘the truth is out there’, if only people would see. 
While creationists might not naturally turn to The X Files for answers, they are still 
exposed to this media-driven ethos, and the market provides them with products that 
will not offend their Christian sensibilities. This devolved truth-seeking represents a 
paradox at the heart of contemporary evangelicalism, born out of a dogmatic notion of 
truth, which is in part pursued within a deregulated religious marketplace. Only by 
placing cultural engagement at the forefront of our analysis can we hope to unravel 
the possible future trajectories through which this paradox may evolve.  
 
Third, cultural engagement is a useful perspective because it taps into the nature of 
creationism as a thoroughly discursive form of Christian expression. As driven by 
combative debate, legal dispute and educational conflict, it is not surprising that 
creationism appears to us historically as a strand of fundamentalist affirmation 
characterized by complex and impassioned rhetoric. And yet this trend runs deeper, 
into the theological affinities of the early movement. Ronald Numbers notes that, 
during the 1960s, theologians in the Wesleyan-Holiness tradition tended to remain 
faithful to the gap and day-age readings of Genesis 1, rather than switch allegiance to 
the increasingly novel Genesis flood geology associated with authors like Whitcomb 
and Morris, in contrast with many Baptists, Adventists and Lutherans, who expressed 
more sympathy with the new ideas.42 Why this should be is uncertain, although the 
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established theological tensions between Pentecostals and more Reformed Protestants 
may have been a contributing factor, with a continuing distrust between the two 
parties lending neither any strong inclination to adopt the other’s peculiar identity 
markers. Pentecostals appeared predisposed, because of their experiential, 
conversionist focus, to prioritise evangelism and celebration over the discursive 
engagement with science and worldly questions which so attracted those conservative 
Protestants preoccupied with matters of doctrine. This synergy appears so strong that 
one might venture to suggest that the future of the creationist cause may in part 
depend on whether a Reformed, conservative evangelicalism maintains a dominant 
place among theologians, church leaders and the active laity, not to mention the more 
nebulous ‘grass roots’ forces at the popular level in virtual and off-line reality. That 
this tradition appears in the ascendancy within the UK context43 raises interesting 
questions about the future of creationism and its capacity as a cultural force within a 
society typically suspicious of conservative religion.  
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